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1 INTRODUCTION
By 2015, it is clear that the United States is no longer in a posi-
tion simply to “change the regime or those who govern” in Brazil, 
as Jan Knippers Black described one key element of US penetration 
of Brazil in her 1977 book.  The rapid progress of the global “neoli-
beral project,” if nothing else, seems to have drastically attenuated 
the US role in hemispheric international relations, based, as they 
have increasingly become, on market forces.  In short, Brazil is 
no longer as economically vulnerable to US resource and market 
needs alone, having become a dominant member of Mercosul, 
a founding member of BRICS, and a world economic force in its 
own right, the current economic and political crises to the contrary 
notwithstanding.  
The long term US-Brazilian relationship, rather, has been 
described as “so complex and so different from US relations with 
the countries of Hispanic America that, even among hemispheric 
policy makers, few in the United States understand it” (HRINAK, 
2005). Indeed, academic works over the last two decades (e.g., 
HIRST, 2005) have themselves seemed to misunderstand the 
complexity of US-Brazilian relations in the age of BRICS, the “Pink 
Tide,”  and political crises, tending to minimize the importance 
of Brazil to US policy makers, while paradoxically pointing to 
Brazil as a “regional giant,”  and arguing that “the deterioration 
in the quality of US relations with the region as a whole…incre-
ases the importance of maintaining an open channel of unders-
tanding with Brazil” (SOARES DE LIMA and HIRST, 2006: 35). In 
the age of Chinese influence and BRICS, moreover, Brazil’s signi-
ficant influence in a range of foreign policy areas, both regional 
and global, is now undeniable, even if US policy makers are often 
confused by the complexity of US-Brazilian relations. 
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Evidence of a continuing, quiet intervention in Brazilian poli-
tics, what Black referred to more comprehensively as a full menu 
of “penetration” strategies, apparently persists, albeit in a more 
covert form.   The publication of hundreds of confidential US State 
Department cables, to and from US Embassies around the world, 
were published on the WikiLeaks website in 2010 and 2011, and 
then re-published in news media and internet sites over the next 
several years, under the title of “Cablegate.”   Hundred of these, 
directly involving US activities in Brazil, were republished in their 
original English language format in the Brazilian national news-
paper, Folha de São Paulo, and have been used as sources in this 
study.  Like most researchers in this area, I was overwhelmed by a 
vast quantity of evidence.
Many of these cables directly reference the continuing pene-
tration of US interests and influence in contemporary Brazilian 
domestic and foreign politics.  In short, they seem to fit James 
Rosenau’s general definition of foreign penetration, summarized 
by Black in her book, as “members of one polity serv[ing] as parti-
cipants in the political processes of another” (Black 1977: xiv). I 
was only able to examine partial and incomplete evidence in the 
form of a few of the 251,000 confidential and non-confidential US 
diplomatic cables, most of which were posted between 2004 and 
2009 beginning in February 2010. I was also dependent upon the 
Folha de São Paulo for their choice of which cables they chose to 
publish.
I hesitated to use stolen US State Department cables released 
through a highly questionable source, WikiLeaks. The background 
to the acquisition and release of the thousands of confidential and 
secret cables is well documented (e.g., NICKS, 2012; MITCHELL, 
2011; EL PAÍS, 2011), as are the vagaries of the WikiLeaks orga-
nization, whose founder, Julian Assange, remains in refuge in 
the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in order to prevent his extra-
dition to Sweden or the US on a variety of serious charges rela-
ting to various charges including the release of the stolen cables 
(DOMSCHEIT-BERG, 2011; NEW YORK TIMES, 2011; SIFRY, 
2011).   
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The cables themselves, however, have appeared in thousands 
of secondary sources worldwide, and have become integral to poli-
tical interpretations of US foreign policy.  The Folha de São Paulo 
published them in their original English language and format-
ting, for example, and they are now deeply embedded in popular 
culture, and have resulted in significant responses which cannot 
be explained except through reference to them.  Moreover, I am 
presenting only a light sampling of the evidence in this abbreviated 
study. There were 19 cables, for example, that mentioned Defence 
Minister Nelson Jobim by name, describing his unexpected role in 
providing inside intelligence to US policy makers, and despite the 
stated intent in several of the cables to regard him as a “protected 
source.”  His role is only one limited aspect of this study, however. 
The concentration, rather, is on a limited selection of cables in 
several categories, a few, mostly confidential and secret, cables 
that reveal insights into the continuing, if much diminished, US 
penetration of Brazil. 
2 DECLINE AND FRUSTRATION IN US PENETRATION, AS 
OUTLINED IN “DIPLOMATIC” CABLES
The cables, many of which can only very vaguely be descri-
bed as “diplomatic” in the common use of the word, offer unique 
insights into US attempts to penetrate, or re-penetrate (as often 
appeared to be the case) Brazilian domestic and foreign poli-
tics in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and their release appears 
to have reversed their original intension in most cases.  Perhaps 
the most blatant example, however, was inscribed graphically in 
a 2009 confidential briefing cable regarding a visit by US Assistant 
Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela, in which the diminishing 
capacity of the US government to penetrate the Brazilian polity 
was succinctly stated:
…we face significant historical baggage in the way Brazil’s 
foreign policy establishment views the United States, whi-
ch slows our ability to build a fully cooperative relationship 
with Brazil. Much of Brazil’s foreign policy establishment 
remains cautious and mistrustful toward the United States. 
Bilaterally, a growing and pragmatic interest in cooperating 
with the United States on a range of technical and practical 
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issues is often caught up in fears that Brazil will lose sove-
reign control or will find itself a junior partner on its own 
soil to better funded, staffed, and organized USG partners. 
This has led to persistent problems with visas for U.S. law 
enforcement agencies (particularly, but not exclusively, on 
counterterrorism issues), refusal to accept USG assistance, 
and seemingly unreasonable demands and strictures on va-
rious types of cooperation.1
The United States penetration of Brazil was not what it had 
been. Was its re-establishment now to be regarded as a high 
priority?
2.1 The US and the Brazilian Military
The United States and Brazilian military forces had maintai-
ned a close bilateral relationship after WWII, as outlined in Black 
(1977).  By the late 1970s that relationship virtually collapsed, 
mostly because of President Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on human 
rights, and US resistance to Brazil’s expanding nuclear power and 
weapons programs.  With the end of the military dictatorship in 
1985, Brazilian military politics were at a turning point.  Although 
officers involved with the 21-year military regime were still in 
command of the military, and influential in national politics, Brazil 
was rapidly democratizing. 
A new civilian president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, soon 
moved to create a civilian-led Ministry of Defense, and a civilian-
-led intelligence agency, both of which had previously been the 
political provinces of the military high command, the Estado Maior. 
A new generation of officers were poised to step into command 
positions, moreover, and to redefine the previously hallowed 
concept of “National Security,” emphasizing Amazônia as both a 
crucial and a threatened element of that concept, while retaining 
a manifest suspicion of, if not open hostility to, the US military 
presence in South America under the Southern Command, known 
1  Kubiske, Lisa (2009) “SCENESETTER FOR THE DECEMBER 13-14 VISIT OF 
WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTURO VALENZUELA,” confidential State 
Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 10 Dec 2009 16:08 UTC.
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as SOUTHCOM. The threat seemed to be based, at least to some 
extent, on perceptions that the US (primarily) or European coun-
tries had designs on the Amazon region, either for environmental 
reasons, or, in more paranoic expressions, for eventual imperia-
listic absorption.  The “lungs of the earth” argument (e.g., SILVER, 
2002: 237), voiced widely by environmentalists in the West, was 
often cited as proof of these designs.  
In the late 1990s a Brigadier General serving as the president of 
the Military Supreme Court, and thereby not bound by the RD (regu-
lamento disciplinar) restrictions on officers (prohibiting them from 
speaking on political matters), was asked in a magazine interview 
who it was that the Brazilian military now regarded as a poten-
tial “enemy,” and he famously replied that it was the United States 
(FEROLLA, 1998)2.  Although a good deal of effective “defense diplo-
macy” was expended by SOUTHCOM (and particularly by General 
Barry McCaffrey, a commander of SOUTHCOM in the 1990s), puta-
tive comments by other senior US military officers during that time 
periodically triggered political misunderstandings between the US 
and Brazil, as when a senior US Army general, Patrick Hughes, was 
said to have remarked in a speech in 2000 at MIT that if an ecologi-
cal disaster began to unfold in the Brazilian Amazon, the US milita-
ry might have to intervene to save this global resource.  Two years 
later, the commanding Brazilian General in the Amazon, perhaps 
consequently, declined US offers of assistance to fight massive fires 
that had been set illegally in Amazônia and had expanded alarmin-
gly during an unusual dry spell.  Well before 2010 senior Brazilian 
military officers were largely opposed to anything even vaguely 
resembling US penetration of the Brazilian policy.
2.2 The Curious Case of Defense Minister Nelson Jobim
It is no exaggeration, then, to affirm that the military Estado 
Maior was utterly opposed to the new, civilian-led Ministry of 
Defence implemented by the Cardoso Administration in 1999. 
2  When asked by an interviewer, Marina Amaral, “Quem é o inimigo?” He 
responded, “É o hemisfério norte, principalmente os Estados Unidos.”
Daniel Zirker
130  |  Tensões Mundiais, foRTaLeza, V. 11, n. 21, p. 125-146, 2015
The first five civilian ministers of defence were openly and cover-
tly resisted by the senior commanders, three of whom had lost 
their ex-officio presidential cabinet position in the change.  Initially, 
the open resistance was limited to the three branch commanders, 
and typically led to the implication of civilian appointees to the 
Minister’s position in political scandals, leading to their succes-
sive removal.  It was not until Minister Nelson Jobim’s appoint-
ment by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2007 that the senior 
military officers openly approved of their civilian overseer.  Jobim 
appealed to military sentiments, adopting the military command’s 
open resistance to Lula in the establishment of an Indian reser-
ve, Raposa/Serra do Sol, in 2008 and 2009, and supporting senior 
military commanders in most of their concerns.  He was a former 
leader of the PMDB, and had been the President of the Brazilian 
Supreme Court until just before his nomination.  He remained in 
office for more than 4 years, and resigned under pressure from 
President Rousseff in 2011 after apparently intentionally provoking 
her by publicly denigrating his fellow cabinet ministers.  It appea-
red to be a staged political attack, perhaps just ahead of a mob of 
angry military officers.
The “Cablegate” scandal had shockingly revealed in 2010 that 
Jobim may have been acting as a US intelligence asset.  A 2011 
version of his Wikipedia page (in English) identified him as a “US 
intelligence agent.”  This was soon “edited” to read “a pro-US ally 
within Brazil’s government” and an “identity-protected source”3 
of the US government, quoting directly from released cables.  US 
penetration seems to have been applicable in this case, as several 
“secret” and “confidential” cables revealed.  In the most impor-
tant of these, dated January 25, 2009, the US Ambassador, Clifford 
Sobel, described Jobim’s collaboration with the US in his struggles 
with a fellow cabinet minister, Celso Amorim (who replaced Jobim 
as Defense Minister in 2012) and his own Vice-Minister, Samuel 
Guimarães, in an attempt to implement a “defense cooperation 
agreement” (DCA) with the United States:
3  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nelson_Jobim , accessed May 18, 2013.
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Jobim responded that Guimaraes posed a serious problem, 
not only on the DCA but on a variety of issues.  Jobim said 
that Guimaraes “hates the United States” and is actively 
looking to create problems in the relationship. Jobim said 
that he has had to beat back more than one outlandish pro-
posal by Guimaraes calculated to upset relations with the 
U.S. and other industrialized countries…. [Jobim] told the 
Ambassador that he does not want to “win the battle and 
lose the war” and expend too much political capital on the 
DCA, so will have to proceed carefully.  In particular, he said, 
if Guimaraes and FM Amorim join forces against a DCA, that 
could be a serious problem4.
Perhaps the most indicting evidence of Jobim’s “unusual” collu-
sion with the US, and arguably the best example of US penetra-
tion of the Brazilian Defense Ministry, came in a January 22, 2009 
cable in which Jobim advised the US Embassy that Evo Morales, 
President of Bolivia and a strident opponent of US influence in the 
region, was suffering from a highly secret and potentially serious 
nasal tumor, and that President Lula had confidentially offered 
Brazilian medical assistance in its treatment5.  It is difficult to inter-
pret this disclosure, unlike many of the more than two dozen other 
Jobim disclosures reported in numerous cables, in other than that 
4 Sobel, Clifford (2008) “BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON DCA, TRIP TO 
FRANCE AND RUSSIA, CIVIL AVIATION”, confidential State Department Cable, 
US Embassy Brazil, 2008-01-25 14:53:00. In this cable, it is also reported that 
Jobim “told the Ambassador [Sobel] that the primary purpose of his upcoming 
trip to France is to discuss design issues for a nuclear-powered submarine.  He 
also said that he will look at France’s Rafale airplane.  In Russia Jobim’s primary 
purpose is to ensure servicing for Brazil’s Russian helicopters.  He noted that 
Russia wants to open a jeep facility in Porto Alegre, and that he will travel to 
Russia in an Embraer plane in the hope of making sales there.”  The reader is 
left with the possibility, however, that Jobim is using his confidential disclosures 
to the US Embassy to reinforce his position in his struggle with the Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry, Itamaraty, noted for its hegemonic position.  As the cable ends, 
“Once again, President Lula may have to play the deciding role between an 
unusually activist Defense Minister interested in developing closer ties with the 
United States and an MRE [Itamaraty] that is firmly committed to maintaining 
control over all aspects of foreign policy and to keeping a 
measure of distance between Brazil and the United States.”  
5 Sobel, Clifford (2009) “BRAZIL’S LULA OFFERS BOLIVIA’S MORALES 
TREATMENT FOR TUMOR”, confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy 
Brazil, 2009-01-22 18:51:00.  Jobim, when later questioned by the media about 
this, was quoted as admitting that “‘Morales tinha um problema no nariz’, 
mas afirmou que o telegrama ‘não fazia sentido’ e que suas palavras foram 
exageradas” (EFE, 2010).
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of a US intelligence agent, an impression reinforced in that same 
cable by reference to Jobim as an “identity-protected source.” 
Soon after the release of the cables, reports in the Spanish and 
Brazilian media emphasized the degree to which the United States 
had penetrated Brazilian policy through Jobim.  In a 2010 article in 
Folha de São Paulo, mention was made of Jobim’s apparent collabo-
ration with the United States in attempting to undermine Venezuela’s 
dealings with Colombia over the FARC guerrillas, and his rather 
weak disclaimer when questioned on it.  As Folha reported,
“Falando de temas de segurança regional”, diz um desses 
documentos [cables], “Jobim quase reconheceu a presença 
da guerrilha das Forças Revolucionárias da Colômbia (Farc) 
na Venezuela e deu sugestões para aumentar a seguran-
ça na fronteira entre Colômbia e Equador”.  No entanto, 
Jobim afirma no documento que reconhecer publicamente 
a presença das Farc na Venezuela impediria um eventual 
trabalho de mediação do Governo brasileiro entre Bogotá e 
Caracas.  Perguntado nesta sexta-feira se confirmava essa 
informação, o titular da Defesa respondeu: “Não. Eu disse ao 
embaixador (dos EUA) que se as Farc vierem ao Brasil, elas 
serão recebidas a bala. E que havia a necessidade de acabar 
com as Farc” (EFE, 2010).
By early 2011, cables described Jobim’s unusual cooperation 
with the US Embassy, noting that “Jobim’s focus [is] becoming 
clearer.”
Over the course of several discussions with the Ambassador… 
the most recent on the eve of his departure on January 25 for 
France and Russia, Jobim revealed in increasing detail his 
goals for these visits and his activities in the hemisphere. 
The key elements that emerged are 1) pursuit of a nuclear 
submarine, using French assistance on propulsion as well 
as other systems; 2) a general desire to increase Brazil’s do-
mestic manufacturing capability for weapons via technology 
transfer; 3) more specifically, an interest in becoming a ser-
vice hub in South America for Russian equipment, driven 
by a desire to have greater leverage over Hugo Chavez’s 
Venezuela; 4) a focus on rebuilding Brazil’s military capaci-
ty, including fighter aircraft; and 5) a new, more structured 
organization of South American defense ministers6.
6  Kubiske, Lisa (2011) “NEW IMPETUS TO A GROWING RELATIONSHIP,” 
confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 2008-01-31 13:01.
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Jobim’s position as Minister of Defence was jeopardized follo-
wing the disclosure of the US State Department cables in February, 
2010, given the strong nationalistic tenor of Brazilian military thou-
ght, and the deep suspicion held by many officers of US intentions. 
Although he initially minimized the extent of his involvement with 
the United States, saying that the quotes were “opiniões de embai-
xadores. São manifestações pessoais do embaixador (dos EUA) 
daquela época e que fez afirmações em meu nome, somente isso” 
(EFE, 2010), Jobim found himself increasingly embattled by these 
damning cables. In mid-2011 he apparently intentionally created 
an untenable relationship with President Rousseff by openly criti-
cizing several of his fellow cabinet ministers, and he resigned on 
August 5. The BBC account stressed that he had been angry at 
being overruled by President Rousseff over the purchase of fighter 
jets (BBC, 2011), although it is difficult to imagine how he could 
have maintained a positive interaction with senior military officers 
after the disclosure of his role in the US penetration of Brazil. 
2.3 The US and Brazil’s acquisition of fighters, 2000-2009
The State Department was centrally concerned with a matter 
that bridged many of the most important objectives of US penetra-
tion, the sale of jet fighters to Brazil.  In previous years Brazil had 
insisted on extensive technology transfer, in-country manufactu-
re, and agreements to buy Brazilian-made aircraft as integral to 
any agreement.  In a September 2009 cable, Lula shocked the US 
Embassy officials with his unexpected rejection of what they had 
assumed to be their influence:
In a joint news conference with [French President] Sarkozy, 
September 7, Lula said that Brazil would begin negotiations 
with France for the purchase of thirty-six fighter aircraft. 
Lula cited France’s willingness to transfer technology and 
the importance of consolidating the strategic partnership 
with France as the reasons for his decision. To bolster the 
French case, Sarkozy reportedly promised to buy a dozen 
C390 cargo planes, to be developed by Brazil and to support 
Rio de Janeiro’s bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. The 
French reportedly also promised to assist Brazil in exporting 
future French-Brazilian aircraft to unspecified countries in 
Latin America and Africa….Later press reports indicated that 
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Lula did not rule out the USG or Swedish planes…. Over the 
past several weeks, Mission Brazil has heard the consistent 
message that any decision would be made after Sarkozy’s 
visit. Air Force contacts informed MLO Brasília that they 
would be submitting their technical evaluation to the MOD 
in the week following the visit for review and preparation of 
a recommendation to the President. The evaluation was ne-
ver completed or delivered, meaning Lula’s decision to favor 
the French was taken without the benefit of over a year of 
work by Air Force experts7.
Aside from reference to the US manufactured planes as “USG 
(US Government) planes”, an odd use of language in the neoliberal 
and privatized environment of 2009, the cable reveals a lack of 
sensitivity to the basic ground rules of international capital.  Soon, 
the State Department cables were lamenting what they disparagin-
gly called a “growing love affair” between presidents Sarkozy and 
Lula, one in which “Sarkozy and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva disco-
vered that they shared ‘a vision of a new multilateralism’ in global 
governance and the view of Brazil as a vast market and regional 
platform for France,” and one where 
Brazilian diplomats noted that the two men have very si-
milar personalities and that Lula has often commented that 
looking at Sarkozy is like “looking in the mirror.”  The two 
leaders have put an emphasis on their warm personal che-
mistry and France’s status as the only EU country sharing a 
border with Brazil, with French Guiana located just north of 
South America’s largest country.  The “unique” bilateral par-
tnership and close friendship between the energetic Sarkozy 
and the charismatic and popular Lula is of particular note 
given that the Brazilian president does not speak English or 
French and the relationship is conducted almost exclusively 
through interpreters8. 
United States penetration of Brazil in this vital area of high 
tech weapons provision was now in jeopardy, neo-liberalism be 
damned, and all this despite earlier extensive and cordial contacts 
7  Kubiske, Lisa (2010) “LULA FAVORS FRENCH FIGHTERS -- SITUATION 
SERIOUS BUT NOT HOPELESS” confidential State Department Cable, US 
Embassy Brazil, Wed, 9 Sep 2009 10:20 UTC.
8  Allegrone, Kathleen (2009) “FRANCE AND BRAZIL: THE START OF A LOVE 
AFFAIR,” confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 2009-11-17 
15:21.  
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between Lula and Jobim, and “over a year of work by Air Force 
experts.”   In stark language, the cable warns that “the clear desig-
nation of the French as the front runners means that the USG/
Boeing bid faces a major challenge in order to level the playing 
field.” Again, what is meant by “levelling the playing field”? The 
cable concluded with a reminder: 
Given that Lula’s decision to begin negotiations with the 
French was made following a late dinner with Sarkozy, the 
importance of personal relationships cannot be overstated. 
Should President Obama speak with Lula in the next few 
weeks, it would be important for him to mention the fighter 
sale.
In a cable dated 5 January 2010, Lisa Kubiske reported that 
although Lula continued to favour the French fighters, “Embassy 
contacts in the Ministry of External Relations and Ministry of 
Defense believe that Defense Minister Jobim will meet with Lula 
later in January to try to make a decision”9.   The cable continued:
During October and November, contacts by Embassy offi-
cials and Boeing representatives were received politely, 
but with little real interest as the focus remained on the 
French. In recent weeks, however, there has been a notable 
change from the Minister of Defense. Beginning with A/S 
Valenzuela’s December 14 meeting with Jobim…, there has 
been renewed interest in the USG/Boeing proposal. While 
Jobim repeated concerns about “bad precedents” for poli-
cies regarding transfer of U.S.-origin technology (in reality 
complaints about export licensing procedures), he said he 
understood that the USG had a new approach and was inte-
rested in Boeing’s industrial cooperation offer (Ibid.).
By April of 2013, the FX2 decision had been delayed yet again, 
with the Boeing (and USG) product still in the running (UPI, 2013), 
until Edward Snowden’s release of US National Security Agency 
documents revealing that the agency had been monitoring Dilma’s 
cell phone and otherwise spying on her, provoking her outrage and 
threatening to cancel her upcoming visit to Washington (ROMERO, 
2013). Within three months, a Swedish firm, Saab, was awarded 
9   Kubiske, Lisa (2010) “FX2 AT THE END OF 2009,” confidential State Department 
Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 2010-01-05 19:40:00.
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the fighter bomber contract, apparently in retaliation for the US 
spying incident (HORCH and DREW, 2013).
2.5 Brazil’s Foreign Relations…and Apparent US Preferences
Brazil and Its Neighbors
Venezuelan and Bolivian-Brazilian relations have represented 
particularly challenging subjects for US policymakers, and major 
temptations to penetrate and divert Brazilian foreign policy, as 
Jobim’s dealings with the US Embassy regarding Venezuela and 
Bolivia (recorded in dozens of cables) indicated.  In some of the 
cables, Jobim established his bona fides as an opponent of Hugo 
Chávez, as in a confidential 2009 cable involving Brazilian and US 
activities in Haiti:
During Ambassador Shannon’s introductory call February 5, 
Minister of Defense Nelson Jobim described the overall bila-
teral security relationship as strong and transparent. He said 
he favored expanding it this year, first through a Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (DCA), then through an information 
security agreement. He hopes to sign the DCA during his 
proposed February 23 visit to Washington, if the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs approves in time….Jobim praised the U.S.-
Brazil partnership in Haiti, particularly the strong working 
relationship of Generals Keen and Peixoto. He described 
his visit to Haiti two weeks earlier and called the situation 
“extremely fragile.” Jobim derided concerns expressed by 
Venezuela of a “U.S. invasion” of Haiti, saying that the pro-
ximity of the United States and its capacity to move large 
amounts of material made it natural for the USG to play a 
leading role in relief efforts10.
US policy makers have tended to follow the advice of Jorge 
Castañeda, the former Foreign Minister of Mexico, in his 2006 
article in Foreign Affairs, in which he argued that “distinguishing 
between these two broad left-wing currents [in Latin America] 
is the best basis for serious policy, from Washington, Brussels, 
10  Shannon, Thomas A. (2010) “AMBASSADOR SHANNON’S MEETING WITH 
MOD JOBIM,” confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 18 Feb 
2010 13:08 UTC
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Mexico City, or anywhere else” (42).  He recommended, among 
other things, “taking Brazil seriously as a trade interlocutor” (42) 
as a means to deal with the more difficult leftist countries in Latin 
America.  In that regard, the meeting with Jobim, described in the 
cable above, offered a key example of this: 
Jobim spoke of his efforts to ameliorate tensions between 
Colombia and Ecuador following the 2008 bombing of a 
FARC facility inside Ecuador by Colombian forces. Contacts 
between Defense Ministers, through the South American 
Defense Council (SADC), he said, had been key to managing 
the after effects of the strike, providing a good test case for 
the SADC. Jobim told Ambassador Shannon that Brazil has 
offered to help monitor the Colombia-Ecuador border as a 
confidence building measure. He was less optimistic about 
Brazil’s ability to manage Venezuela and expressed concern 
about Chavez’s increasingly complicated domestic situation. 
He worried aloud about the impact in Venezuela if Chavez 
resorted to violent repression of demonstrators (42).
Reading between the lines, Casteñeda’s prescription is one 
of surrogate interference, with Brazil or perhaps Chile (under 
Bachelet) as the instrument.  A number of the cables suggest that 
this is precisely what the US State Department had in mind.
Another major concern of US policy makers has been the rise 
of Mercosul and, particularly, the possibility of Brazil’s greater 
cooperation in international relations with traditionally indepen-
dent Argentina.  A New York Times article in 2010 picked up on 
a confidential State Department cable that indicated this “worst-
-case” concern, although this time it was Argentina that was follo-
wing Brazil’s independent lead:
More worrisome [than Pakistan’s disclosure of the identi-
ty of the CIA station chief in Islamabad], given its traditio-
nal ties with Israel, the Argentine government’s decision to 
join Brazil in recognizing an independent Palestinian sta-
te was likely a response, at least in part, to a leaked cable 
in which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton questioned the 
mental health of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. 
The damage to U.S.-Argentine relations is likely to be lasting 
(BREMMER and KHANNA, 2010).
Brazil’s growing independence from US policy, it seemed, was 
even influencing (or acting as a bad influence on?) a traditionally 
independent Latin American neighbour.  US penetration of Brazil 
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in this area previously regarded as vital was now apparently a 
hollow shell of its former self.
BRAZIL AND IRAN
The State Department cables record an almost desperate drive 
to divert Brazil’s growing cooperation with the Ahmadinejad gover-
nment in Iran, and Lula’s attempt in 2010 to work with Turkey in 
offering an alternative plan to limit Iran’s nuclear weapons capabi-
lities. In a 2012 article in the New York Times, the authors explained 
that “Iran is a minor player but one that can be particularly proble-
matic.  Iran appears to have used its relations with some Latin 
American countries to try to circumvent international sanctions on 
its financial operations” (NEUMAN and ROMERO, 2012).  In a 2009 
cable, Charge d’Affaires Lisa Kubiske, whose name appears as the 
author of dozens of Brazilian cables, commented that
Brazil recognizes that there are serious questions outstan-
ding about Iran’s and Syria’s nuclear activities and does not 
see these latest IAEA reports as closing those cases. The 
GOB, however, doesn’t seem willing to go much further 
than calling for everyone to cooperate more with the IAEA. 
It strongly opposes unilateral military action and doesn’t like 
the Iran case being with the UNSC. The GOB’s interest in the 
proposals and activities of the P-5 and Germany is more that 
they want to be well-informed than an interest in trying to 
contribute to crafting new measures to pressure Iran11.
While not explicitly mentioning the US concerns with Lula’s 
growing relationship with President Ahmadinejad, the implica-
tion that there were US pressures to reverse this were plain. When 
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo 
Valenzuela visited Brazil in 2009, an Embassy briefing cable revealed 
the enormous discomfort that the US State Department felt regarding 
Brazil’s global foreign policies, and its inability to “penetrate” them:
Where Brazil’s policy is not hesitant, it is often ill-informed 
or straight-jacketed by the policies of the past. As it steps 
out on Middle East issues, the GOB does so with a lack of 
11  Kubiske, Lisa (2009) “BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS 
ON IRAN AND SYRIA,” confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 
9/23/2009 16:39
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expertise on the region. Inclined to take assertions from the 
Syrians, Iranians, and Hizbullah at face value, it insists that 
peace can be achieved only if all players are at the table, and 
seeks to position itself as a neutral party, “the country who 
can talk to everyone,” over against what it perceives as the 
biased U.S. and European efforts. This penchant for dialo-
gue stands together with respect for sovereignty and non-
-intervention in internal affairs as the hallmarks of Brazilian 
foreign policy. But as Brazil plays in a growing number 
of international arenas, it is finding it more difficult to re-
main true to these principles, and more difficult to hide its 
inconsistencies12.
The level of frustration evident in this cable points both to US 
efforts to penetrate Brazilian foreign policy, and its diminishing 
capacity to do so.  Subsequent, if oblique, references to US succes-
ses in pressuring Brazil on this point were evident in the cable 
traffic13.
When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran begins a 
four-nation tour of Latin America on Sunday, showcasing 
his support in the region against a backdrop of international 
tensions over his nation’s nuclear program, he is set to visit 
some of the United States’ most ardent critics: Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador….But the list of countries Mr. 
Ahmadinejad will not be visiting is equally telling. Though 
Iran is reeling from successive rounds of international and 
unilateral sanctions, Mr. Ahmadinejad is not visiting Brazil, 
the region’s economic powerhouse. Nor is he going to 
other large countries like Mexico, Colombia and Argentina, 
underscoring that his visit is limited to nations without 
12  Kubiske, Lisa (2009) “SCENESETTER FOR THE DECEMBER 13-14 VISIT 
OF WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTURO VALENZUELA,” confidential State 
Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 10 Dec 2009 16:08 UTC.
13  As a 2008 cable concluded, “In light of its traditional hesitance to take firm 
positions on contentious country-specific issues, and with visits by Ahmadinejad 
to Brazil and top Brazilian officials to Iran being planned for the next few months, 
Brazil will have a soft voice in the chorus -- but may prove useful nonetheless if 
senior GOB officials can be encouraged to whisper into Iran’s ear the idea that 
negotiation and compliance are its best option.” Kubiske, Lisa (2008) “BRAZIL 
ON IRAN: A SOFT VOICE IN THE CHORUS,” confidential State Department Cable, 
US Embassy Brazil, 11/13/2008 14:21.  This was published in English in the 
Folha de São Paulo in English, but under the heading “Brasileiros podem mostrar 
para Irã que negociação é melhor saída,” 23/12/2010: http://www1.folha.uol.
com.br/poder/849942-brasileiros-podem-mostrar-para-ira-que-negociacao-e-
melhor-saida-leia-em-ingles.shtml , accessed 19 May 2013.
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extensive influence or the capacity to offer much of a major 
economic partnership (NEUMAN and ROMERO, 2012).
In a confidential cable in 2009 Lisa Kubiske was almost ironic 
in her observations, evincing a sense of impotence and frustration 
with Brazil’s awkward and independent steps on the world stage. 
MRE reconfirmed that Israeli President Shimon Peres will 
visit Brasilia on November 11. He said that no dates had 
been confirmed for visits by Ahmadinejad or Palestinian 
President Mahmoud Abbas, but said that the Ahmadinejad 
visit will happen in late November, which would push back 
the Abbas visit into December at earliest....Pires also spoke 
briefly about Brazil’s decision to back Egyptian candidate 
Farouk Hosni over Irina Bokova for the UNESCO Director 
General....Several local publications have criticized the GOB 
position on this matter, calling it a “diplomatic defeat” dic-
tated by Lula’s desire to strengthen relations with Iran and 
the Middle East. These same reports, apparently based on 
leaked sources from Itamaraty, also questioned why Brazil 
did not make the case to promote one of its own, UNESCO 
Deputy Director-General Marcio Barbosa. When asked about 
the matter, Pires smiled wryly, shook his head and said, “the-
se are the things we have to do sometimes”14.
Lula’s apparently close relationship with Iran’s President 
Ahmadinejad led to extensive, if oblique, criticism in the cable 
traffic, indicating strong US pressure on Lula and, eventu-
ally, a weakening of the relationship, as perhaps evidenced in 
Ahmadinejad’s failure to visit Brazil in 2012.
CHINA AND BRAZIL
China increasingly occupied the attention of the State 
Department, with fears expressed in one cable regarding the 
Chinese penchant for computer hacking15  Brazil’s growing 
14  Kubiske, Lisa (2009) “REPORT GETS THE BRAZILIANS THINKING,” confidential 
State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 10/7/2009 17:30.
15  As GLANTZ and MARKOFF reported in the New York Times (2010) regarding a 
State Department cable dated May 18, 2009, “That cable from American diplomats 
was one of many made public by WikiLeaks that portray China’s leadership as 
nearly obsessed with the threat posed by the Internet to their grip on power — 
and, the reverse, by the opportunities it offered them, through hacking, to obtain 
secrets stored in computers of its rivals, especially the United States.
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economic relationship with China, in particular, and China’s 
expanding presence in other Latin American countries, triggered 
a surprisingly small number of cables, tending to underscore the 
United States’ declining penetration of Brazil, Brazil’s increasin-
gly high-level political and economic cooperation with China, and 
consequently the US’s declining penetration of the region, parti-
cularly after 2003.   An especially revealing cable pondered the 
quixotic moves by Peru to acquire Chinese, Brazilian and Russian 
weaponry, describing China and Brazil as if they constituted a new 
power axis:
Peru is reportedly poised to purchase Chinese tanks wi-
th an eye towards replacing its aging tank fleet and buil-
ding up its “dissuasive” defense posture, and to buy aircraft 
from Brazil as well as MANPADS and anti-tank weapons 
from other countries. These defense acquisitions are sur-
prising, in light of President Garcia’s high profile regional 
“Peace and Disarmament Initiative.” Neither were they dis-
cussed during the wide-ranging strategic dialogue in Lima 
with USSOUTHCOM’s Commander December 1-3. While 
President Garcia and Defense Minister Rey have defended 
the purchases and criticized sceptics, most observers be-
lieve the prospective tank purchases respond to domestic 
political pressures fuelled by the perceived provocations of 
Chile16.
All of the general concerns of US policy makers, including 
deteriorating trade relations, seem to have coalesced in this one 
confidential cable, as well as clear disappointment with declining 
respect for, and the lack of inclusion of the United States in, elite 
policy making.  The cable continued: 
The planned arms purchases were also notable for their 
absence during the wide-ranging strategic pol/mil dialo-
gue in Lima between USSOUTHCOM Commander General 
Douglas Fraser and his Peruvian counterparts December 
1-3. To the extent that arms acquisitions were discussed, 
the Peruvians complained about the slow and complicated 
U.S. defense procurement process (FMS and FMF) and hi-
gh price tags for U.S. equipment such as helicopters. After 
agreeing with their U.S. counterparts regarding the primacy 
16 McKinley, P. Michael, Ambassador (2009) “CHINESE TANKS, PEACE 
PROPOSALS AND U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT,” confidential State Department 
Cable, US Embassy Peru, 15 December 2009; 23:08
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of the internal threat arising from drug trafficking and terro-
rism, the Peruvians also told General Fraser that their main 
external threat emanated from Bolivia, where they see Evo 
Morales as consolidating power, eliminating political rivals 
and seeking to extend his radical brand of indigenous popu-
lism beyond his borders, with ALBA’s help (Ibid.).
The US and Brazilian Trade Relations
US-Brazilian trade relations have traditionally centered on 
Brazil’s provision of low-priced commodities and industrial 
support products (e.g., car parts), and its purchase from the US 
of very expensive manufactured goods. Moreover, after 1972, 
US-Brazilian trade relations were qualified by Brazil’s enormous 
international debt, the highest in the world for nearly a decade 
(until it was displaced in that category by the United States and 
Canada), much of which was owed to US banks, and a structu-
ral imbalance in overall trade relations in favour of the US.  In 
the past two decades, however, these patterns have changed 
markedly.  While the US remained Brazil’s primary source of high 
cost imports, it was rapidly being overtaken by China; and as for 
Brazil’s sale of its commodities and industrial goods, China led the 
list of foreign country recipients by a significant margin.  Brazil, on 
the other hand, shifted from the category of debtor nation to that 
of creditor. 
The US and the PT Presidencies
Immediately after Lula’s election in 2002, the US diplomatic 
team in Brasília sought to influence the new PT administration.  An 
early confidential cable, perhaps reflecting more wishful thinking 
than actual influence, painted a particularly favourable picture:
Assistant Secretary Reich had warm and productive meetin-
gs in Brasilia November 20-21 with President-elect Lula da 
Silva, his senior advisors in the PT, and Brazilian congres-
sional leaders. Both Ambassador Reich and Lula expressed 
great interest in working together across a range of issues, 
particularly trade. The PT team floated the idea of conclu-
ding a bilateral trade pact with the US, but will first consult 
with their Mercosul partners and then likely raise some pro-
posals during Lula’s December 10 visit to Washington. Lula 
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is eager to meet President Bush, sure that “two politicians 
like us will understand each other when we meet face to fa-
ce.” In keeping with efforts by Lula to distance himself from 
Castro and Hugo Chavez, PT leader Aloizio Mercadante sou-
ght to downplay his participation in the “Sao Paulo Forum” 
as an attempt to set a democratic example for other Latin 
American leftists17.
The cable continued, stressing the awkwardness of the US 
opposition to Lula during his 2002 presidential campaign, followed 
by an almost desperate drive to regain influence in the presidential 
palace:
Assistant Secretary Reich commented that even after 9/11 
the US will continue to pursue a range of interests (com-
mercial, economic, political, security) in the hemisphere. 
President Bush’s phone call to Lula after the Brazilian elec-
tions and invitation to the White House are strong signals of 
the USG’s desire to strengthen ties to Brazil under Lula. The 
message, Reich emphasized, is that the US and the incoming 
Brazilian government need to get beyond any preconcep-
tions we may have had about each other and focus on things 
that bring us together (Ibid.).
The emergence of Dilma Rousseff in 2009 as a strong presi-
dential candidate likewise touched off a strong response in the US 
Embassy, especially regarding Brazil’s potential foreign relations 
under a possible Rousseff presidency.  US military and civilian offi-
cials began a series of meetings with Rousseff, and with Jobim, as 
a September 2009 cable revealed:
Dilma Rousseff told [National Security Advisor] Gen. [James 
L.] Jones that the GOB finds it disconcerting to be faced with 
questions from the press regarding why the United States ne-
eds such bases [in Colombia]. According to Rousseff, issues 
such as this open the door for radicals who want to create 
problems in the region. Gen. Jones emphasized Colombia’s 
need for assistance in maintaining its security against drug 
traffickers and the FARC, and then recounted Uribe’s concerns 
that his fight against the FARC was made more difficult becau-
se of FARC positions in other countries. In all three meetings, 
Gen. Jones explained the nature of the agreement as largely 
formalizing the current relationship. He said he was willing to 
send a team of USG civilian and military officials to provide 
17 Reiter, Richard (2002) “REICH’S MEETING WITH LULA,” confidential State 
Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 2002-11-22 12h01.
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additional information, but stressed that it was unfortunate 
that others were playing up this issue in the press since USG 
officials including himself were available to talk whenever 
GOB officials had concerns about USG actions….Jobim told 
Gen. Jones that Brazil has great expectations of the Obama 
Administration, noting that transparency was a very impor-
tant component of the U.S. relationship with South America. 
He noted that issues like the Colombia bases become more 
difficult when the GOB learns of them through the press, but 
added that Brazil, too, is often surprised by the sensitivities of 
“Spanish America” regarding issues that would be considered 
innocuous elsewhere. Gen. Jones encouraged Jobim to call if 
there were further doubts about U.S. intentions18.
 One cable, briefing Washington officials on the 2010 national 
elections in Brazil, advised that “the debates will indicate how the 
two major coalitions, if elected, could address issues of interest 
to the United States19, and in early 2010, warned, in a cable full of 
lightly veiled criticism, that 
With both sides unwilling to promote distinctive alternati-
ves to prevailing economic policy in a pre-election environ-
ment, Brazil’s two principal rival parties - President Lula’s 
Worker’s Party (PT) and front-running presidential candi-
date Jose Serra’s Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) 
- are increasingly eager to air their differences on foreign 
policy. Congressional voting and debate over issues such as 
Colombia-Venezuela, Honduras, and Iran have grown incre-
asingly partisan, with coalition lines enforced. Strongly opi-
nionated individual members, especially those who travel 
frequently to key countries, have proven more effective than 
party leaders or relevant committees in shaping the foreign 
policy debate. In the case of PT, this allows some of their 
most militant to shape priorities, as seen in PT’s new foreign 
policy platform, tentatively approved in December. PT has 
addressed its lack of foreign policy outside of Lula by bolste-
ring the credentials of presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff 
with recent visits to Copenhagen and Germany20.
Additional developments did not appear to ease US concerns, 
however. At least in the short term.
18  https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BRASILIA1113_a.html.
19 Kubiske, Lisa (2009) “BRAZIL’S 2010 ELECTIONS: ONE YEAR OUT,” confidential 
State Department Cable, US Embassy Brazil, 10/21/2009 14:21.
20 Kubiske, Lisa (2010) “BRAZIL: FOREIGN POLICY AS AN EMERGING CAMPAIGN 
ISSUE,” confidential State Department Cable, US Embassy, 1/8/2010 16:29. 
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3 CONTEMPORARy US PENETRATION OF BRAZIL: 
CONCLUSIONS
As late as 2006, major scholars of US-Brazilian relations were 
routinely and inaccurately minimizing the level of US involve-
ment and, especially, US willingness to pursue penetrative poli-
cies, while nonetheless exaggerating its power position in Latin 
America.  SOARES DE LIMA and HIRST, for example, argued that 
“state-to-state political relations between the United States and 
Brazil primarily aim for prudent coexistence, possible collabora-
tion and minimal collision,” insisting that the “the United States 
moves ahead towards the consolidation of an uncontested power 
position, [while] Brazil searches for a secure and legitimate econo-
mic and political platform in South America” (2006: 33-4). As the 
hundreds of cables from “Cablegate” have graphically demons-
trated, however, the US was (and would continue to be) almost 
frantic in its efforts to penetrate Brazilian politics, while Brazil’s 
influence with a range of countries openly hostile to the United 
States was growing proportionally.  China was rapidly replacing 
the US as Brazil’s major trading partner, much to the chagrin of 
the authors of many of the diplomatic cables.  Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela were increasingly regarding Brazil as a useful, if not 
particularly close, ally, and even apparent US “intelligence assets” 
would only find occasional and marginal information on them to 
report. And the looming presidency of Dilma Rousseff was regar-
ded as a threat, and this was given high priority in the cables.
It would be a mistake to discount the apparent successes of US 
penetration at this transformative juncture, and likewise an error 
to ignore counter explanations of those successes.  “Turning” (if 
that is what it was) Jobim represented a major point for the intro-
duction of US influence at one of the focal points of Brazilian 
power.  Jobim’s pressures may have been evident in key outco-
mes, or non-outcomes, in US-Brazilian military relations.  The 
jet fighter contract, so important to US-Brazilian military links as 
well as trade relations, was ultimately undermined by awkward 
efforts at US penetration of the Brazilian foreign and domestic 
policy process, although the Boeing contract seems to have been 
a contender during part of Dilma’s presidency only because of US 
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penetration, if the cables are to be believed. Iran ultimately snub-
bed Brazil in Ahmadinejad’s 2012 visit to Latin America after appa-
rent US interference.  And even Jobim’s quixotic departure from 
government in 2011 underscored the likelihood that he had, inde-
ed, influenced policy at some point.
The overriding message of the State Department cables as regar-
ds Brazil, then, if a single message can be adequately identified, is 
that the United States by 2008 was struggling, with some success, 
to reaffirm its penetration of Brazil and Latin America. Even in its 
most strident concerns, moreover, such as the war on terrorism, 
the United States policy makers found themselves watching impo-
tently as Lula (with Turkey) “meddled” in UN-Iranian relations, 
negotiated with Russia, China and India in BRICS, strengthened 
Brazilian ties with the late Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and with 
Evo Morales of Bolivia, and generally “flaunted” its political inde-
pendence from the US, if not the latter’s growing impotence in 
what must now be regarded as the renewed United States penetra-
tion of Brazil. As the cables revealed, the ability of the US to stamp 
its preferences on Brazilian domestic and foreign policy may have 
lacked a certain penetration, but not for trying.
